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This paper analyzes the ad hoc decision of three Asian countries to peg their currency to
the U.S. dollar prior to the Asian crisis. It uses the Sjaastad model to estimate the optimal
basket weights for Thailand, Korea, and Singapore. The analysis in this paper differs from
the optimal basket research since we are not searching for an ad hoc optimal basket; rather,
the basket is the solution to the problem. For Thailand and Korea, the correct weights of
the dollar in the basket are estimated to be 44 and 65 percent, respectively, which differ
significantly from the actual weight of 100 percent for the U.S. dollar in their currency
basket prior to the 1997 Asian crisis. Singapore, with a weight of 85 percent for the U.S.
currency, is closer to a dollar peg, and therefore was less affected by the large depreciation
of the European currencies and the yen toward the dollar that occurred prior to the Asian
exchange rate crisis. Besides the fact that Singapore had better economic fundamentals
prior to the crisis, the fact that the optimal basket for that country is closer to a dollar peg
is an additional reason why its economy was less severely hit by the crisis.
JEL classification codes: E 32, F31
Key words: optimum currency area, Asian crisis, exchange rate basket,
currency peg
I. Introduction
This paper analyzes the policy choice of Thailand, Korea, and Singapore
to peg their currency to a single currency. The results of this analysis suggests
that these countries, particularly Thailand and Korea, should have pegged
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their currency to a basket of currencies rather than to the U.S. dollar alone. If
they had pegged their currencies to a basket that included the German mark
and the Japanese yen as well as the dollar, their currencies would have been
automatically depreciated against the dollar during the large appreciation of
the dollar against all other currencies that occurred prior to the Asian exchange
rate crisis.
This paper uses the Sjaastad (1998 and 2000) model to determine to which
currency bloc(s) those countries belong. The model demonstrates that, if the
price level in a country is affected by more then one currency bloc, then this
country can isolate itself from shocks to its inflation and real interest rates by
choosing a peg to a currency basket. The optimal weights for that basket,
according to Sjaastad’s model, are the relative price-making powers that major
currency countries have over that country. A single-currency peg is a special
case of a currency basket, and is a possible solution if a country is affected by
a single currency. If the United States were to have one hundred percent price-
making power over the traded goods of those Asian countries, then the optimal
“basket” that would isolate their inflation and real interest rates from external
price shocks would be a U.S. dollar peg.
The basket weights are estimated for Thailand, Korea, and Singapore.
Thailand and Korea are of special interest since both countries were severely
affected by the Asian crisis. To have a comparison, the weights for Singapore,
a country that was far less affected by the Asian crisis, are also estimated.
The estimation results, using Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models, show
that while the weights for the U.S. dollar in the baskets for Thailand and
Korea are relatively low, 44% and 65%, respectively, the weight for the U.S.
dollar in the basket for Singapore is around 85%. Singapore’s basket, with an
85% weight for the US dollar, is closer to a dollar peg than Korea’s and
Thailand’s basket weights. Therefore, the sharp appreciation of the dollar
against all other currencies prior to the Asian crisis had a greater effect on
Thailand and Korea, which were further away from their optimal basket than
was Singapore. Besides the fact that the Singapore economy had better
economic fundamentals prior to the crisis, as described in Corsetti, Pesenti,
Roubini (1999), the fact that they were closer to a dollar peg is an additional
reason why the economy of Singapore was not so severely hit by the crisis.
Data limitations precluded estimates for additional countries.343 REAL EFFECTS OF MOVEMENTS IN NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATES
II. Various Explanations for the Crisis
One of the most common causes of an exchange rate crisis is that even
though a country has an exchange rate peg, it still acts as if it had an
independent monetary policy. The monetary data for Korea, Thailand, and
Singapore show no evidence of a monetary expansion that could have led to
the collapse of the exchange regime in 1997. The monetary base for Korea
stayed constant, between 1995 and late 1996, with a noticeable drop of 13
percent from late 1996 to mid July 1997. This contraction was also reflected
in the monetary base in real terms and in real M1, and was accompanied by
low inflation rates (4%-5%). The money supply of Thailand dropped
significantly in 1997 without putting deflationary pressure on the prices. The
monetary and price data in Thailand and Singapore show a similar pattern of
decline, as observed in the Korean data. Overall, the monetary data shows
that there was a recent contraction in money supply. Since there were no
extreme price changes, the money supply must have accommodated changes
in the money demand.
Another traditional explanation for a currency crisis is that of speculative
attacks. According to this view, sudden shifts in market expectations and
confidence are the key sources of the initial financial turmoil, its propagation
over time, and regional contagion. Radelet and Sachs (2000) argue along
those lines, and suggest that the 1997 Asian crisis was a financial panic. This
view has attracted many proponents as an explanation for that crisis. Most
standard explanations for speculative attacks argue that the collapse of a fixed
exchange rate is preceded by fiscal deficits, rising debt levels, and inflationary
deficit financing. However, the Asian economies, prior to the 1997 crisis,
were characterized by budget surpluses, low levels of debt, high foreign
exchange reserves, and low levels of inflation.
Since traditional fiscal models could not explain the Asian crisis, a second
generation of fiscal models have emerged. For example, Corsetti, Presenti
and Roubini (1999) use a moral hazard model to explain the Asian Crisis. In
their model, the economy operates as if bad outcomes by firms are fully insured
by the government. Eventually, foreign creditors refuse to refinance the
countries’ cumulative losses, and this refusal forces governments to step in
and guarantee the outstanding stock of external liabilities through the use of344 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
seigniorage revenues. Speculation, driven by expectations of inflationary
finance, causes a collapse of the currency and anticipates the event of a
financial crisis. The government uses international reserves (that otherwise
could have been used to bail out insolvent private firms) to defend the currency,
and a financial crisis ensues. Similarly, Burnside, Eichenbaum, Rebelo (2000)
argue that the crisis was caused by large prospective deficits associated with
implicit bailout guarantees to failing banking systems. Again, the expectation
that seignorage revenues would finance these future deficits led to a collapse
of the fixed exchange rate regimes.
Chang and Velasco (1998) offer another explanation, when they argue
that the Asian crisis was a consequence of international illiquidity. They trace
the emergence of illiquidity to financial liberalization, a shortening of the
foreign debt structure, and the unbalanced currency denomination of assets
versus liabilities.
In what follows, I will argue that, in addition to the financial sector and
banking sector weaknesses, the exchange rate policies, particularly in Thailand
and Korea, were not optimal. The analysis concludes that, in the cases of
Thailand and Korea, pegging to a basket containing U.S. dollars, German
marks and Japanese yen would have been more appropriate than pegging
their currencies to a single currency. The interesting feature of the analysis is
that we are not searching ad hoc for an optimal basket. Rather we have found
that the basket presents the solution to our problem.
In other literature concerning this subject, authors have searched for an
optimal basket starting with the assumption that a basket is the best exchange
rate policy.1 Studies by Bhandari (1985), Flanders and Helpman (1979),
Turnovsky (1982), Flanders and Tishler (1981), and Lipschitz and
Sundararajan (1980) focused on an optimal basket based on ad hoc criteria
such as minimizing the variance in the balance of payments, and found that
trade weighted baskets are the optimal policy choice. Those solutions assumed
that a basket is the optimal solution and, since most countries trade with more
than one country, the optimal basket under those criteria includes the currencies
of all trading partners. Therefore, those solutions are unlikely to lead to a
corner solution (a basket that includes only one country).
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In this paper, corner solutions that allow a pure US dollar peg are acceptable
solutions. This is possible because in the Sjaastad (2000) model the weights
of the basket are chosen according to the relative price-making power that
countries have over the prices of traded goods of a given country. Trade flows
are a significant component in deciding which countries may have price-
making power, but they are not the only determinants. For example, most
Asian countries have significant trade with Singapore. In the case of Malaysia,
23.3 percent of total exports go to Singapore, and 15.4 percent of total imports
come from Singapore; but Singapore obviously does not determine the world
prices of Malaysia’s traded goods, such as electrical machinery, crude
petroleum, telecommunications, vegetable oil, etc. Since the price-making
power of Singapore over Malaysia is likely to be low, the Singapore dollar
does not need to be present in the Malaysian currency basket. If we were to
follow the optimal currency basket literature described above, however, we
would need to give a significant weight to the Singapore dollar in a basket for
Malaysia.
Recent optimal basket studies such as those derived by Ito, Ogawa and
Sasaki (1998) improve upon the earlier models by building a model based on
micro-foundations. In their model the oligopolistic exporter maximizes his
profits so that the export price is endogenously determined in response to the
exchange rates. Therefore, price “stickiness” is a result of optimizing behavior
and is not an assumption as in the earlier models. The optimal solution in
their model is to minimize fluctuations in trade balances. Their result is closely
related to the trade pattern seen in a particular country.
Independent of the model used, most optimal basket estimations conclude
that, if an appropriate basket had been chosen prior to the crisis, the Korean
won and the Thai baht would have been automatically depreciated against
the US dollar. Since, in fact, the major currencies depreciated strongly against
the dollar from April 1995 until mid-1997. Instead, as the dollar appreciated,
these Asian currencies also appreciated against the yen and the mark, since
they were pegged to the US dollar. Market participants anticipated that, with
the dollar’s appreciation, and with their currencies pegged to the dollar, there
was pressure on the existing peg. Prior to the crisis, the Koreans had already
accelerated the rate of won depreciation against the dollar ¾  indicating that
the Koreans also had recognized the dangers of an appreciating US dollar.346 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
III. The Model
Sjaastad (1998 and 2000), assuming that excess demand for goods q is a
function of their real price and that excess demand has to add up to zero,
derives the following key equations:
                                 + “fundamentals,” where
In this text, capital letters indicate natural logarithms. PTx, Pj, Ex,j,
j
x Q
represent the price index for traded goods in country x, an index of the price
level of country j, country j’s currency in terms of country x’s currency, and
non-negative fractions that sum up to one (100%), respectively. The term
,
j
x Q measures the share of power possessed by country j in the world market
for the goods traded internationally by country x. For example, if the United
States has the entire price-making power over country x’s traded goods,
US
x Q would be equal to one and all other  's
j
x Q  would be equal to zero.
As indicated in equation (1) the sum of 
j
x Q over j is equal to one. An
intuitive explanation for this is the following hypothetical experiment. Keeping
all exchange rates constant, if the price levels of the countries of the world
were to double, then the prices of country x’s traded goods would also have to
double.
Using the identities Ex, j = Ex, i + Ei, j, Ex, i = –Ei, x,  1
j
x Q= å and adding Ei,
xon both sides of the equation (1), we can rewrite the equation as:
The term PTx + Ei, x in equation (2) is the price of traded goods of country
x converted to the currency of country i. For notational simplicity we define
PTFx º PTx + Ei,x, where the capital F after the variable indicates that the
variable is expressed in the currency of country i. Similarly, the term Pj + Ei,j
is the price level of country j expressed in currency i. Again, to simplify the
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In the following estimations we use the US dollar as currency i, and all
variables are transformed to US dollar terms using equation (2). Since price
data is available as a monthly variable, monthly exchange rate averages are
used for the conversion of the prices. Note that the derivation does not depend
on what currency is chosen as currency i. As long as the left hand side and the
right hand side variables in equation (3) are expressed in a common currency,
the choice of currency i does not affect the estimation of the  's.
j
x Q
We would like to use equation (3) to estimate the  's.
j
x Q However, the data
for PTFx is not available for the individual countries. In order to estimate
equation (3) we need to replace PTFx  with variables that we have data for.
For this purpose, we can construct the traded good index as a weighted average
of import price index IMPx, and export price index EXPx:
where TTx = EXPx - IMPx is the terms of trade and PTx is a domestic-currency
price index of traded goods. Rewriting the equation (4) in terms of currency
i we arrive at:
PTFx = IMPFx + W.TTFx (5)
Here,  PTFx  is  a  price  index  of  traded  goods  for country x in currency
i, IMPFx  a  price  index  for  import  goods  for  country  x  in  currency  i,
and EXPFx a price index for export goods for country x in currency i. Further,
TTFx = EXPFx - IMPFx.
Price changes do not affect the economy instantaneously, and the effects
are accumulated over several periods. Therefore to allow for lags in the
transmission of the price effects, we have parameterized the model as an
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model. Using equation (5) and
parameterizing the model as an ARDL, we can write equation (3) as:
(1 ) xx x PT EXP IMP =W× + -W ×
, xx IMP TT =+ W ×
(4)
(6) ,, , () [ () ] [ () ]
j
xx t x j t x x t
j
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We have time series data for all variables in equation (6). Writing out the
details of equation (6) we get:
where we define: - ax, i / ax, 0 º ãx, i , - Ax(L) / ax, o º Ãx(L), and       (L) / ax, 0 º 
j
x B (L).
First, equation (7) was estimated as individual linear regression equations for
Thailand, Korea, and Singapore. The residuals from those regressions were
somewhat correlated, therefore a SUR (seemingly unrelated regression)
estimation was used. All regression coefficients were slightly more significant
using the SUR estimation, however the coefficient values themselves (and the
      did not change significantly between the two methods. The “RATS”
software package is used to estimate the system of equations (SUR) for all
three countries. The SUR function computes estimates of a system of linear
equations using the techniques of joint GLS. In the estimations that follow the
price indices of Germany, Japan, and USA were used as explanatory variables.
Including other countries as explanatory variables, such as other European or
Asian countries, did not alter the results. Coefficients for those countries were
not significant and were dropped. Finally, the following system of linear
regressions was estimated using the price indices of the United States, Germany,
and Japan as explanatory variables:2
where x = Thailand, Korea, Singapore.
Using the estimation coefficients, we can calculate the  's
j
x Q  as:
,, , , , xt x1 xt 1 xn xt N IMPF a IMPF a IMPF -- =× +× + %% K
,, [( ) ] [( ) ] ,
j
xj t x x t
j







2 It is assumed that the small countries Thailand, Korea, and Singapore are price takers,
they cannot influence the world price of their traded goods. Therefore, their price making
power in the world market for their traded goods is negligible.
,, , , , xt x1 xt 1 xn xt N IMPF a IMPF a IMPF -- =× +× %% K
, [( ) ]
USA
xU S A t BL P F +× + %
, [( ) ]
Germany
xG e r m a n y t BL P F × %
,, [] [ ( ) ] ,
Japan
x Japan t x t B PF A L TTF +× + W × × % %
(8)
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IV. Estimation Results
The data used are monthly export and import prices for Thailand, Korea,
and Singapore (International Financial Statistics (IFS) lines 74 and 75).
Monthly CPI’s for Germany, Japan and the USA (IFS line 64). Monthly
exchange rate averages for all countries (IFS line rf).
In this section, the regression results ¾ the weights     for the currency
basket ¾ are presented. Singapore, which was not as seriously affected by
the 1997 Asian crisis, was included in the estimates as a counter example to
Thailand and Korea.
The Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) was used to determine the
appropriate lag length for the regressions. The estimations were repeated,
using several countries as explanatory variables, including Germany, United
States, Japan, England, Switzerland, Singapore, Australia, and many other
Asian and European countries. The only significant coefficients were those
for Germany, United States, and Japan.
Table 1 summarizes the results of the augmented Dickey Fuller test for all
variables. The appropriate lag length for the augmented DF test was determined
using AIC. According to the DF test all variables in levels are either I(1) or
I(0). To achieve stationarity, we first differenced the data. The unit root
hypothesis can be rejected for all variables in the first differences.
We ran the unrestricted SUR estimation as in equation (8). According to
the model the basket weights 's
j
x Q must add up to one. The hypothesis that the
basket weights add up to one cannot be rejected, with c2 = 9.61 and significance
level of 0.03. Therefore we run the same regression, equation (8), imposing
the following unit sum restriction:
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Table 1. Augmented Dickey Fuller Test Results.
(Sample: 01/1980-01/1997)
DF test w. Joint test: DF test Joint test: DF test w.
constant trend = 0 with const. = 0 no constant, Conclusion
and trend root = 1 constant root =1 no trend
IMPFThailand -0.82 1.63 0.95 4.11 2.82 Unit root w.
zero drift
IMPFKorea -1.87 1.82 -1.21 0.86 -0.57 Unit root w.
zero drift
IMPFSingapore -1.68 2.37 -0.53 0.35 0.64 Unit root w.
zero drift
TTFThailand -3.35 5.98 -3.32 Unit root
rejected
TTFKorea -1.39 1.72 -1.81 1.65 -1.72 Unit root w.
zero drift
TTFSingapore -2.98 4.56 -0.37 1.62 -1.69 Unit root w.
zero drift
PFUSA -3.89 Unit root
rejected
PFGermany -2.81 4.18 -0.54 0.60 0.91 Unit root w.
zero drift
PFJapan -1.83 2.05 -1.35 2.34 -2.17 Unit root
rejected
DIMPFThailand -11.23 Unit root
rejected
DIMPFKorea -6.59 Unit root
rejected
DIMPFSingapore -7.64 Unit root
rejected
DTTFThailand -11.65 Unit root
rejected
DTTFKorea -7.39 Unit root
rejected351 REAL EFFECTS OF MOVEMENTS IN NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATES
DTTFSingapore -7.49 Unit root
rejected
DPFUSA -7.56 Unit root
rejected
DPFGermany -8.95 Unit root
rejected
DPFJapan -9.60 Unit root
rejected
Critical value -3.41 6.25 -2.86 4.59 -1.95
Table 1. (Continued) Augmented Dickey Fuller Test Results.
(Sample: 01/1980-01/1997)
DF test w. Joint test: DF test Joint test: DF test w.
 constant trend = 0 with const. = 0 no constant, Conclusion
and trend root = 1 constant root =1 no trend
Table 2 summarizes the results of the restricted regression. All variables
except for the coefficient for 
Germany
Korea B
~  (which is almost zero) are highly
significant. Dropping that variable from the regression does not change the
results. We use the regression coefficients to calculate the basket weights as
in equation (9).
Table 3 summarizes the basket weights. Thailand with a 
j
Thailand Q of 22%
for Japan, 34% for Germany, and 44% for the United States is strongly
influenced by fluctuations in the yen, the DM, as well as the dollar. If the
Thai baht had been pegged to a basket choosing the weights accordingly, the
currency would have been automatically depreciated towards the US dollar
prior to the crisis, as will be shown in the next section.
The price making power of the United States, Germany and Japan over
Korea,  ,
j
Korea Q is 65%, 19%, and 16%, respectively. The United States seems
to have a larger influence on the local price level in Korea than it does on
Thailand.
The basket weights for Singapore are estimated as a benchmark. Singapore
has a comparable economic and geographic situation to Thailand and Korea,352 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Table 2.  Regression Results. (Sample: 01/1980-01/1997)
Summary of
sum of lag Standard Significance
coefficients error value
for variables
0.349 0.15 2.20 0.02
0.284 0.16 1.69 0.09
0.224 0.07 3.27 0.00
0.143 0.04 3.21 0.00
0.523 0.07 7.64 0.00
0.309 0.06 4.86 0.00
0.091 0.04 2.13 0.03
0.077 0.03 2.22 0.02
0.341 0.11 2.97 0.00
0.561 0.10 5.48 0.00
0.022 0.07 0.31 0.75
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Table 3. Basket Weights for Korea, Thailand and Singapore: the Weights
for Germany, Japan, and USA in the Basket. (Sample: 01/1980-01/1997)
Basket weights for Basket weights for Basket weights for
x = Thailand x = Korea x = Singapore
usa
x Q 44% 65% 85%
Germany
x Q 34% 19%   3%
Japan
x Q 22% 16% 12%
but it did not experience as severe a crisis as the other two countries in 1997.
The basket weights for Singapore, ,
j
Singapore Q are 85% for the United States,
and 12% for Japan, and 3% for Germany. The regression coefficient for
Germany (which is used to calculate the basket weight for Germany) is not
statistically significant. However, the coefficient is almost zero and dropping
it from the regression does not alter the result.
The higher weight of the dollar in the currency basket of Singapore suggests
that pegging its currency to the dollar has caused less pressure on the currencies
of Singapore than it did on Korea, and particularly on Thailand, during the
sharp appreciation of the US dollar prior to the Asian crisis.
V. Depreciation in the Baht and in the Won
An interesting question to ask is the following: Suppose Thailand and
Korea had pegged their currency to a basket of currencies using the
s '
j
x Q estimated in this paper as their basket weights. How much would the
won and the baht have depreciated prior to the crisis? Using Sjaastad’s model
and our estimates in section IV, we have calculated the depreciation in those
currencies as if they had been pegged to a currency basket with the optimal
basket weights,
j
x Q (for a derivation of equation (11) please refer to the
Appendix).354 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Equation (11) indicates that the depreciation in the currency of country x
against the US dollar is determined by changes to the exchange rate rule
between the currency of country x and basket B ), ( ,B x E & and by the depreciation
of the yen and the DM vis a vis the U.S. dollar. Note that since, in our example,
the Thai baht and the Korean won are pegged to basket B, . 0 , = B x E &
In April 1995, the U.S. dollar started to appreciate against all major
currencies. The German mark depreciated against the U.S. dollar from 1.38
in April 1995 to 1.79 at the beginning of the Asian crisis in July 1997 ¾ a
thirty percent depreciation. The yen depreciated against the U.S. dollar from
83.67 in April 1995 to 115.16 in July 1997 (depreciating even further
thereafter) ¾ a thirty-eight percent depreciation. If at that time, Thailand and
Korea had had their currencies pegged to the baskets as suggested in this
paper, equation (11) indicates that the Thai baht and the Korean won would
have depreciated against the U.S. dollar by 18 and 12 percent, respectively.
Equation (12) is a general expression for the inflation rate in the small
country x when that country pursues an exchange rate rule based on a basket
of the three major currencies (see Appendix for derivation):
Since country x pegs its currency to the basket B, , 0 , = B x E & so it is clear
that choosing the basket weights gj such that g = Q will eliminate external
price shocks. The inflation rate in the small country is going to be the world
inflation rate, which is represented here by a weighted average of the inflation
rates of the three major currency countries:  .







The exception, in which a single exchange rate rule could eliminate shocks
to the inflation rate, occurs when the
j
x Q for the anchor country is one, and
thus all other  s '
j
x Q are zero. In that case, the inflation in the small country
would be the same as the inflation in the anchor country. For example, if
Korea and Thailand were in a U.S. dollar currency area
usa
x Q ( = 100%), then
once they pegged their currency to the U.S. dollar, their inflation (and real
interest rates) would be equivalent to those in the United States.
,$ , $, $,
Japan Germany
xx B x Y e n x D M EE E E =- Q × - Q × && & & (11)
3 1, 3 x 2 1, 2 x B x W x E E E & & & × - Q + × - Q + + P = P ) ( ) (
3 2
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VI. Conclusions
In this paper, I have attempted to determine if pegging their currencies to
the U.S. dollar was a good policy choice for Thailand, Korea and Singapore,
and whether an alternative policy choice might have reduced the effect of the
1997 Asian crisis on those countries. The results of the regression analysis
indicates that Thailand and Korea are not only affected by the U.S. dollar, but
also by the German mark and the Japanese yen; and that a basket of currencies
including the mark and yen would have been more appropriate than pegging
to a single currency. Singapore is mainly influenced by the US dollar, therefore
pegging to the US dollar alone was a more appropriate policy choice for
Singapore.
The author’s view is that, without a currency basket that included the
German mark and the Japanese yen, Thailand and Korea were very adversely
affected by the appreciating dollar prior to the Asian Crisis; due to their
exchange rate peg, their currency appreciated together with the U.S. dollar
against all other currencies. If they had pegged to a currency basket, as
suggested in this paper, their currencies would have been automatically
depreciated against the U.S. dollar as a consequence of the depreciation of
the Japanese yen and the German mark.
Appendix
Equations (13) to (20) summarize the Sjaastad (2000) model. Defining
                          as the purchasing power parity (PPP) real exchange rate
of country x with respect to that of country j, and ignoring the “fundamentals,”
we can rewrite equation (1) as:
Assume now that a small country x has adopted a credible exchange rate
rule with respect to currency k. After some manipulations and using the identity
                      equation (13) can be written as:
x j x j
R
j x P E P E - + º , ,





x x x E P PT , (13)
, , , , k x j k j x E E E + =
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Writing equation (14) in terms of changes, we get (15), where the notation
is obvious.





x k k x
T
x E E , , & &
In the standard analysis of sources of external inflation, only the second
term on the right hand side of equation (15) is taken into account. However,
since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, real exchange rates have
been very volatile, and the third term has been a quantitatively important
source of external price shocks, where 
R
j k E , & are changes in the real exchange
rate between country k and j.
The price level of a country is a weighted average of the prices for its
traded and nontraded goods  . ) 1 ( x x x x x PT PNT P × - + × = a a Therefore equation
(14) can be extended to the overall price level of country x:
An important implication of equation (16) is that, while a credible exchange
rate rule may result in interest rate parity, it is not sufficient to assure equality
of real interest rates, and in the inflation rate. Ignoring the first term in equation
(16) and writing it in terms of changes gives us:





x k k x x E E , , & &
As can be seen from the equation (17), movements in the real exchange
rate in the j countries lead to shocks in the inflation rate of country x that has
pegged its currency to country k. While a single-currency exchange rate rule
cannot eliminate the shocks to the inflation rate arising from real exchange
rate movements, a rule based on a basket of currencies ¾  whereby a basket
that is chosen such that the weights are equal to the  s '
j
x Q ¾ can eliminate
those shocks. A single-currency exchange rate rule is a special case of a
currency basket. As explained in Sjaastad (2000), a rule based on a basket
allows yet another degree of freedom, namely the choice of the basket weights.
Therefore the basket weights can be chosen to eliminate deflationary and
inflationary shocks to the inflation and the real interest rates.
(15)





x k k x x x x x E P E PT PNT P , , ) ( ) ( a (16)
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To illustrate this, consider three major currency blocs (the U.S. dollar, the
German mark, and the yen) referred to as currencies 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
The number of units of currency j in the basket is referred to as xj and e1,j
denotes the value of currency j in terms of currency 1, where ln(e) = E. The
basket is labeled “B” and its value in terms of currency 1 is given by:
To get the price of the basket in terms of the currency of the small country
x, we multiply the two exchange rates.
And this also defines the exchange rate rule adopted by country x. By
letting g be the weight of the three j currencies in that basket and writing
equation (19) in terms of logarithmic changes, we get:
Note that equation (20) in the Appendix is identical with equation (11) in
the text, where the countries choose  Q = g as their basket weights.
We set k = 1 in equation (17) and replace Ex, j in equation (17) with equation
(20), further, we use  , , , 1 j 1 j
R
j 1 E E P - + P = & & to obtain equation (12) in the text.
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